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Allison Christians*

Designing a More Sustainable Global
Tax System

The international tax system incentivizes unsustainable business practices
because it ignores the private profits created by externalizing human, societal,
and environmental costs. This paper proposes a novel reform: applying living
wage and externality assessment tools to the rules for establishing where income
arises for tax purposes. To do so, I propose a method that is relatively complex but
arguably more accurate (in tax terms) and a complementary but relatively simpler
proxy method. I examine how each method would implicate treaty-based and
domestic rules and processes and conclude that the proposed design provides a
viable starting point to make the global tax system support sustainable business
practices without running afoul of international standards and without necessarily
driving down cross-border investment.
Le système fiscal international encourage les pratiques commerciales non durables
parce qu’il ne tient pas compte des profits privés créés par l’externalisation des
coûts humains, sociétaux et environnementaux. Cet article propose une réforme
novatrice : l’application d’outils d’évaluation du revenu de subsistance et des
externalités aux règles permettant de déterminer le lieu d’origine du revenu à des
fins fiscales. Pour ce faire, je propose une méthode relativement complexe mais
sans doute plus précise (en termes fiscaux), ou alors une méthode de substitution
complémentaire mais relativement plus simple. J’examine comment chaque
méthode impliquerait des règles et des processus nationaux et fondés sur des
traités, et je conclus que la conception proposée constitue un point de départ
viable pour que le système fiscal mondial soutienne les pratiques commerciales
durables sans enfreindre les normes internationales et sans nécessairement faire
diminuer les investissements étrangers.
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Introduction
All over the world, capital is invested in activities that produce
unsustainable social and environmental externalities. Instead of responding
with corrective regulations, politicians have done the opposite, effectively
subsidizing firms that ignore these costs by permitting the resulting profits
to be booked in low-tax regimes. Thereby incentivized by technical rules
that are all but invisible to the public, the unsustainable exploitation of
people and planet appears unstoppable even as it threatens societies with
total collapse.
However, an opportunity to reverse course is emerging. This Article
explains why and how to change course. Part I sets the stage by explaining
why and how societies have inadequately valued and ultimately subsidized
externalized social and ecological costs to date. Part II examines emerging
tools that make it increasingly possible to count these costs and develops
a novel framework for applying such tools to the tax system, where
externalized costs turn into subsidized profits. Part III analyzes the
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implications of the framework and examines its feasibility in light of
emerging investor and consumer demand for sustainability. The article
concludes that the framework would be an appropriate tool to help the
world move toward more sustainable business and investment practices.
I. Status quo global tax: an unsustainable system
Over the past ten years, headline news has featured a steady stream of
stories about multinationals reaping record profits,1 engaging in socially
and environmentally destructive behaviours,2 and paying lower taxes than
they ever have before.3 These trends are not typically connected in public
discourse, but they should be because their concurrence demonstrates
something fundamental about what societies value, and how perceptions
of value change under the realization that past actions meant to support
human flourishing have instead led to planetary destruction. Concerns
surrounding each issue have led researchers, policymakers, and business
leaders to ask fundamental questions about value creation and its role
in legal reform.4 Perceptions of value creation influence the design of
1.
See e.g. Daisuke Wakabayashi, “Alphabet Earnings: Profits Triple and Slump Worries Ease,”
New York Times (25 July 2019), online: <www.nytimes.com/2019/07/25/technology/alphabetearnings.html> [perma.cc/9WJS-NMSX]; Greg Magana, “Amazon’s Q4 earnings reported record
profit,” Business Insider (4 February 2019), online: <www.businessinsider.com/amazon-q4-2018record-profit-2019-2> [perma.cc/7RR7-S9D5]; Georgia Wells, “Facebook Posts Record Profit,
Capping Grueling Year,” The Wall Street Journal (30 January 2019), online: <www.wsj.com/articles/
facebook-reports-record-profit-11548882887> [perma.cc/4NA8-5QGJ] .
2.
See e.g. Marc Bain, “Nike is facing a new wave of anti-sweatshop protests,” Quartz (1 August
2017), online: <https://qz.com/1042298/nike-is-facing-a-new-wave-of-anti-sweatshop-protests/>
[perma.cc/4K5W-PG6L]; Jamie Fullerton, “Suicide at Chinese iPhone factory reignites concern over
working conditions,” The Telegraph (7 January 2018), online: <www.telegraph.co.uk> [perma.cc/
CZ3P-7E6D]; Martine Parry, “The True Cost of Fast Fashion,” (25 April 2018), online: Fairtrade
Foundation
<https://www.fairtrade.org.uk/Media-Centre/Blog/2018/April/The-true-cost-of-fastfashion> [perma.cc/PT3T-VZAY].
3.
See e.g. Rob Davies, “Starbucks pays UK corporation tax of £8.1m,” The Guardian (15
December 2015), online: <www.theguardian.com/business> [perma.cc/7TB9-SQNW]; David
Kocieniewski, “GE’s Strategies Let It Avoid Taxes Altogether,” New York Times (24 March 2011),
online: <www.nytimes.com/2011/03/25/business/economy/25tax.html> [perma.cc/4K5W-PG6L];
Charles Duhigg & David Kocieniewski, “How Apple Sidesteps Billions in Taxes,” New York Times
(28 April 2012), online: <www.nytimes.com/2012/04/29/business/apples-tax-strategy-aims-at-lowtax-states-and-nations.html> [perma.cc/WE4Q-YDLU]; “Tax Paid By Some Global Firms in UK ‘An
Insult,’” BBC News (3 December 2012), online: <www.bbc.com/news/business-20559791> [perma.
cc/2J5H-NTN4]; US, Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, The Shifting of Profits Offshore
by U.S. Multinational Corporations: Hearing Before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations
of the Subcommittee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, 113th Cong 2, 2013; European
Commission, Press Release, IP/15/5880, “Commission decides selective tax advantages for Fiat in
Luxembourg and Starbucks in the Netherlands are illegal under EU state aid rules” (21 October 2015),
online: <europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5880_en.htm> [perma.cc/5959-GNSB].
4.
See e.g. Mariana Mazzucato, The Value of Everything: Making and Taking in the Global
Economy (London: Allen Lane, 2019) (Mazzucato’s work revisits that of Marilyn Waring, who drew
the same conclusions thirty years ago to virtual silence in academic and policy circles); Marilyn
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multiple forms of regulatory activity including, most crucially in terms of
delivering economic incentives, the tax system.5
1. Intangibles as value creators
Responding to the negative news headlines about tax avoidance, in recent
years policymakers have focused on improving the way value is measured
for tax purposes, albeit to date with a limited scope of view. The idea is
that to ensure multinationals contribute their fair share to society, their
income should be taxed “where economic activities generating the profits
are performed and where value is created.”6 Consensus on how to do so
Waring, If Women Counted: A New Feminist Economics (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1988); See
also Marilyn Waring, Counting for Nothing: What Men Value and What Women are Worth (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1999). Recent regulatory and policy reforms reflect that policymakers
are contending with the same issue. See e.g. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub L No 115-97, §14221–23,
131 Stat 2054 (2017); EC, Council Directive (EU) 2016/1164 of 12 July 2016 Laying Down Rules
Against Tax Avoidance Practices That Directly Affect the Functioning of the Internal Market, [2016]
OJ, L 193 1, (stating that “the current political priorities in international taxation highlight the need
for ensuring that tax is paid where profits and value are generated” at 1); Allison Christians, “Tax
Activism and the Global Movement for Development through Transparency” in Brauner & Stewart,
eds, Tax, Law and Development, (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2013) at 288-315; “Pulling the
Plug: How to Stop Corporate Tax Dodging in Europe and Beyond,” Oxfam 1, 8 (March 2015), online:
(pdf):<www.oxfam.org> [perma.cc/P9BR-LLYS]; Tim Cook, “A Message to the Apple Community
in Europe” (30 August 2016), online: <www.apple.com/ie/customer-letter/> [perma.cc/42W9-JNNB]
(arguing against a European Commission determination involving Apple’s dealings in Ireland because
it violated the principle that a “company’s profits should be taxed in the country where the value is
created”).
5.
The concept of value creation has intuitive appeal even if its implications are highly contested.
See e.g. Michael Lennard, “Act of Creation: The OECD/G20 Test of “Value Creation” as a Basis for
Taxing Rights and Its Relevance to Developing Countries” (2018) 25:3 Transnational Corporations
J (critiquing the concept and its impact for developing countries); Allison Christians & Laurens van
Apeldoorn, “Taxing Income Where Value is Created” (2019) 22:1 Fla Tax Rev 1 (analyzing how the
tax system deals with valuation and demonstrating the flaws inherent to fragmentation and geographic
assignment of a given stream of income); Werner Haslehner, “Taxing where value is created in a postBEPS (digitalized) world?” (30 May 2018), online (blog): <kluwertaxblog.com/2018/05/30/taxingvalue-created-post-beps-digitalized-world/> [perma.cc/Q2S9-RKR9]. (distinguishing value capture
from value creation and questioning which one ought to be the focus of income taxation).
6.
See OECD, Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (2013), online (pdf): <www.oecd.
org/ctp/BEPSActionPlan.pdf> [perma.cc/FZ4Y-L8A9] (Explaining that all G20 countries have “called
on countries to examine how their domestic tax laws contribute to [base erosion and profit shifting] and
to ensure that international and domestic tax rules do not allow or encourage MNEs to reduce overall
taxes by artificially shifting profits to low tax jurisdictions,” and that the OECD had accordingly
developed action plans “to ensure that profits are taxed where economic activities generating the
profits are performed and where value is created”); OECD, Aligning Transfer Pricing Outcomes with
Value Creation—Actions 8-10: 2015 Final Reports (2015) at 3, DOI: <10.1787/9789264241244-en>
(stating that “weaknesses in the current rules create opportunities for base erosion and profit shifting
(BEPS), requiring bold moves by policy makers to restore confidence in the system and ensure that
profits are taxed where economic activities take place and value is created”); European Commission,
Fair Taxation of the Digital Economy (2018), online: <ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/business/
company-tax/fair-taxation-digital-economy_en> [perma.cc/FTT7-8E8K]. (“Today’s international
corporate tax rules…fail to recognize the new ways in which profits are created in the digital world,
in particular the role that users play in generating value for digital companies. As a result, there is a
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is hampered by traditional modes of thinking about value. In particular,
intangible assets such as concepts, processes, and branding are especially
valuable to modern multinationals.7 As legal instruments, intangible
assets such as licenses are intuitively understood to create value as feeand profit-generators.8 As the asset can be legally located wherever the
creator chooses, the fees and profits follow.9 Intangible assets are therefore
powerful economic levers, even if they are often invisible in discussions
about the economics of sustainability.
Meanwhile, natural resources and the labour to develop and assemble
goods and provide services are systemically assigned low value relative to
the other contributors to modern business profit.10 Even when a product is
a tangible good made with scarce resources that must be sourced, altered,
and assembled through physical processes with significant long-term
effects on people and the environment, popular wisdom has it that the
“real” value is not created by these things.
2. From value creation to subsidy
The implications of this wisdom are broad when considering the logic
demonstrated. If value derives primarily from legally recognized and
therefore economically marketable intangibles, then any quantifiable
function can be used to drive taxing rights away from countries that
provide human and natural resources to legal constructs in low-tax
regimes.11 The logic of value creation thus contributes to tax avoidance
disconnect—or ‘mismatch’—between where value is created and where taxes are paid”).
7.
See e.g. Terence Tsai, Bor-shiuan Cheng & Donna Everatt, The Acer Group’s China
Manufacturing Decisions (9A99M009) (London, ON: Ivey, 1999) (laying out the visualization of the
global value chain of a computer according to Acer CEO Stan Shih).
8.
See e.g. Jonathan Douglas Putnam, The value of international patent rights (PhD Dissertation,
Yale University, 1997) [unpublished]; Dominique Guellec & Bruno van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie,
“Applications, grants and the value of patent” (2000) 69:1 Economics Letters 109; Markus Reitzig,
“What determines patent value?: Insights from the semiconductor industry” (2003) 32:1 Research
Policy 13; Susan Lund et al, “Globalization in Transition: The Future of Trade and Value Chains,”
McKinsey Global Institute, (16 January 2019), online (pdf): <mckinsey.com/mgi> [perma.cc/D6X69CCD].
9.
See e.g. H Stewart Dunn Jr, “Tax Considerations in Patent Assignments and Licenses between
Related Corporations” (1961) 16:3 Tax L Rev 315; See also Allison Christians & Stephen E Shay,
“Assessing BEPS: Origins, Standards and Responses” (2017) 102A C de D Intl Fiscal Assoc
(explaining that the ability to assign valuable legal rights to low-tax jurisdictions is a primary method
to avoid taxation). In this context it is significant that strong protection of intellectual property rights
became part of a global agenda through the GATT/WTO system. See Julia C Morse & Robert O
Keohane, “Contested Multilateralism” (2014) 9:4 Rev Intl Organizations 3854.
10. See Everett, Tsai & Cheng, supra note 7.
11. In contrast no value is typically assigned to rent seeking, even though it is clear that regulatory
arbitrage and lobbying for beneficial reforms can be a major source of value for firms. See e.g.
Jeff Gerth, “GE’s Taxes: A Case Study,” Fortune Magazine (4 April 2011), online: <fortune.
com/2011/04/04/ges-taxes-a-case-study/> [perma.cc/9XJQ-QLTE] (describing GE’s 1,000 member
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because value plays a key role in defining and assigning business profit to
specific taxpayers located in different jurisdictions.
Technical rules transform the intuition of value creation into specific
tax outcomes. The core rules that accomplish this are those designed to
assign corporate income across the members of multinational groups,
namely arms’ length transfer pricing—so named because it seeks to
price transactions among commonly controlled companies at the price
that unrelated, or arm’s length, market participants would agree is fair.12
De facto harmonization across countries occurs in the form of a set of
“Transfer Pricing Guidelines” propagated and continuously updated by the
OECD.13 Transfer pricing theoretically divides a stream of profit amongst
all relevant contributors in proportion to their respective contributions.
The idea of transfer pricing might be conceptually coherent in some
theoretical sense but as a system, it is inordinately complex to achieve
in practice. This has led some to call for worldwide consolidation and
allocation (such as through formulary apportionment).14 But any form
tax department as a profit center that “boosted its 2008 and 2009 reported profits by a total of about
$1 billion just by changing its mind about how it treated some of its overseas earnings”); Robert
Alexander, Susan Scholz & Stephen Mazza, “Measuring Rates of Return for Lobbying Expenditures:
An Empirical Analysis Under the American Jobs Creation Act” (2009) 25:4 JL & Pol 401 (showing
the return on investment in political influence over tax policy matters in the United States to be as high
as 22,000 per cent); Brian Kelleher Richter, Krislert Samphantharak & Jeffrey F Timmons, “Lobbying
and Taxes” (2009) 53:4 Am J Pol Sci 893 (showing that each additional dollar spent on lobbying
generates between US$6 and 20 of tax benefits for firms); Jennifer L Brown, Katharine D Drake &
Laura Wellman, “The Benefits of a Relational Approach to Corporate Political Activity: Evidence
from Political Contributions to Tax Policymakers” (2014) 37:1 J American Taxation Assoc at 70
(showing that firms that cultivate relationships with tax policy-makers tend to have lower subsequent
effective tax rates than those that do not).
12. The principles of arm’s length pricing extend to unincorporated enterprises in some respects.
See e.g. Robert Couzin, “The OECD Project: Transfer Pricing Meets Permanent Establishment”
(2005) 53:2 Can Tax J at 401-407. As such, the arm’s length principle permeates taxation beyond the
quintessential multinational organization.
13. OECD, OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations
2017 (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2017), DOI: <10.1787/tpg-2017-en> [hereinafter, Transfer Pricing
Guidelines]. Some countries have detailed national transfer pricing laws and regulatory structures
in place, for example in the United States, IRC § 482, while others have a statute but little or no
accompanying regulatory regime, as in Canada, Income Tax Act, RSC 1985, c 1 (5th Supp), s 247;
the Netherlands, Corporate Income Tax Act, 8b (3), 29b-h; South Africa, Income Tax Act, s 38. A
few countries, including Hungary, Mongolia, and Namibia, explicitly adopt the Transfer Pricing
Guidelines as domestic law. See “2018-19 Worldwide Transfer Pricing Reference Guide,” Ernst &
Young, online: <ey.com> [perma.cc/CL2L-NEQA]. Others acknowledge them to be a useful reference
that reflects international views if not a legal authority. For discussion, see Allison Christians, “How
Nations Share” (2011) 87 Ind L J 1407, DOI: <10.2139/ssrn.1815305>.
14. See e.g. Valpy Fitzgerald & Tommaso Faccio, “Sharing the Corporate Tax Base: Equitable
Taxing of Multinationals and the Choice of Formulary Apportionment” (2018) 25:2 Transnational
Corporations J 1; Joann Martens Weiner, “Formulary Apportionment and Group Taxation in the
European Union: Insights from the United States and Canada” (2005) Taxation Papers, Directorate
General Taxation and Customs Union, European Commission, Working Paper No 8.
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of profit allocation that assigns profit according to conventional notions
of value creation will fail to address the significant value derived from
externalizing social and environmental costs. As profits are continuously
allocated to the countries with significant wealth and resources that can
reinvest them productively, these countries are enabled to continuously
improve the conditions that allow them to claim more profits for tax
purposes in the future.
What is needed is an approach that focuses on the core task of correctly
identifying geographic source, including when the source of value is in the
form of externalized costs.15 Such an approach would apply as a corrective
in line with the underlying foundational principles rather than a deviation
therefrom.16 This is the aim of the framework outlined in the next section.
II. Framework for reform
It would be possible to more accurately measure the value created when
profit is derived by externalizing costs ideally in a way that is consistent
with existing principles. To do so would require an acceptance of the core
idea that cost reduction is a common and quantifiable source of value to
firms. The discussion that follows seeks to establish why this claim should
be accepted.
1. The role and value of cost saving
Cost reduction is intuitively simple and in many cases easily measured,
but its relationship to income for tax purposes requires some explanation.
In general terms, identifying potential cost savings is a common goal of
routine supply chain analyses.17 Saving costs theoretically allows either

15. The reason the concept of income is sound as a tax base is that it permits countries to tax different
people appropriately and differently, based on their ability to pay. See J Clifton Fleming Jr, Robert J
Peroni & Stephen E Shay, “Fairness in International Taxation: The Ability-to-Pay Case for Taxing
Worldwide Income” (2001) 5:4 Fla Tax Rev 299. A system that deviates from this fundamental
principle violates some of the core pillars that explain the circumstances under which the state’s power
to tax should be seen as legitimate such that the polity may be seen as obligated to cooperate. See
Allison Christians, “Drawing the Boundaries of Tax Justice” (2013) in Kim Brooks, ed, The Quest
for Tax Reform Continues: The Royal Commission on Taxation Fifty Years Later (Toronto: Carswell,
2013) 53.
16. See e.g. Susan C Morse, “The Transfer Pricing Regulations Need a Good Edit” (2013) 40:5 Pepp
L Rev 1415 (explaining that unilateral “Incremental transfer pricing reform is more feasible and less
risky than sweeping adoption of a global formulary apportionment approach.” at 1443); Stephen E
Shay, “Comment on Selected Aspects of Proposals in Public Consultation Document on Addressing
the Challenges of the Digitalization of the Economy” (March 2019) Boston College Law School,
online: <papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3349186> [perma.cc/XXQ2-DX95] (stating
that “it is appropriate and important to determine if it is possible to achieve a re-alignment of taxing
jurisdiction using modifications of existing income tax principles and concepts” at 5).
17. See e.g. Alireza Anvari et al, “A Study on Total Quality Management and Lean Manufacturing:
Through Lean Thinking Approach” (2011) 12 World Applied Sciences J 1585.
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price reduction for the consumer or increased profit for the firm, or both.
More profit translates into more tax base overall, but cost savings also
have a distributional effect on the location of profit when more than one
jurisdiction is involved in the value chain.
When firms save costs in their supply chains, it shows up as profit
at some point (unless paid out, for example in the form of additional
compensation).18 When cost savings translate into increased profit, a
government is likely to impose taxation. The fact that cost saving produces
value is not controversial. Controversy may arise, however, when more
than one jurisdiction may be said to be the source of the profit, and when
costs saved by some activities are counted while costs saved by others are
not. For example, a specific patented technique or trademarked process is
a legally identifiable source of saving in a supply chain. But the benefit
that arises from systemically-produced harms to vulnerable people and
the planet is not. Activities that produce profit by harming people and
the planet occur with the highest frequency and most damaging effect
in the world’s poorest countries, while activities that produce profit by
innovating can occur anywhere. They often occur in tax-favoured regimes,
with lucrative effect in the world’s richest countries.
Accordingly, when the supply chain is international, the innovative
ideas, technology, and methods that allow companies to streamline,
integrate their activities and design new processes and products
are assigned virtually all of the value created through international
cooperation. There is no doubt that these inputs are value drivers, but the
ability to externalize social and environmental costs is also a major value
driver, and it is routinely ignored. A solution is to acknowledge that cost
externalization reduces costs in the same sense that an innovative idea or
process does, and therefore attempt to quantify the former in the same way
as we currently do the latter.
2. Revealing uncounted costs: emerging tools
Following the logic of supply chain management, a firm is very likely to
realize cost savings by outsourcing to relatively less developed countries,
as has been well documented across the literature, as well as being
acknowledged by courts.19 A firm is likely to find relevant cost savings in
the form of under-compensated labour, whereby workers are paid less than
a living wage; uncompensated environmental impact, whereby regulations
18. Costs saved may generate cash flow that is reinvested and therefore the profit it generates is
delayed to future taxable periods or indefinitely.
19. See e.g. Sundstrand Corp v Comm’r of Internal Review, 96 TC 226 (1991) (examining cost
savings involved in taxpayer’s decision to expand operations outside of the United States).
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that would otherwise internalize such costs to the polluter are lacking
or impossible to enforce;20 and failures of public social infrastructure,
including effective administrative and legal systems, which prevent
needed social programs from being funded, thus privatizing gains while
transferring risk to the public.21
These cost savings arise because of lack of development, as evidenced
by a commitment to their elimination reflected in the Sustainable
Development Goals endorsed by all countries of the United Nations.22
Systemic deprivation of human rights forces individuals to work for
less than a living wage and without adequate social and environmental
protections.23 Systemic deprivation of civil and political rights prevents
individuals from holding irresponsible and harmful governments to
account. 24 Systemic lack of development forces even the most responsible
governments to allow firms to use the environment unsustainably.
Countries that do not suffer from systemic lack of development generally
do not tolerate and trade on these conditions, but instead invest in the
physical and legal (regulatory) infrastructure necessary to eliminate them.
Externalizing the costs of social and environmental damage is
extremely valuable to firms in the same way as adopting resource-saving
manufacturing and transportation designs and processes.25 The economic
source of these cost savings is lack of development. For tax purposes, the
geographic source logically follows: it is where the lack of development
occurs. Failing to account for these value drivers in the tax system in effect
rewards policies that enable systematic exploitation of people and natural

20. See e.g. Will Steffen et al, “Planetary Boundaries: Guiding Human Development on a Changing
Planet” (2015) 347:6623 Science 1259855, DOI: <10.1126/science.1259855> (explaining early use of
“waterways and airsheds as ‘dumping grounds’ for waste from industrial processes” at 1259855-1).
21. See e.g. Vincent Arel-Bundock & Srinivas Parinandi, “Conditional Tax Competition in American
States” (2018) 38:2 J Pub Pol’y 191 at 261 (if a country’s legislators are not properly funded and
staffed, they cannot undertake policy research to avoid poor legislative choices).
22. According to the World Bank, taxation is a “significant factor” in 10 of the 17 sustainable
development goals. See “Taxation and SDGs: First Global Conference of the Platform for
Collaboration on Tax,” World Bank, Conference Report (undated) at 9, online (pdf): <documents1.
worldbank.org> [perma.cc/ACQ3-ADSQ] at 9. In fact, taxation is relevant to realization of all the
goals, as acknowledged in the same report. Ibid at 17 (stating that “revenues to fund public services”
and to “promote economic growth and equitably distribute public resources” are needed in connection
with all 17 of the goals).
23. See e.g. World Health Organization, Closing the Gap in a Generation: Health Equity Through
Action on the Social Determinants of Health (2008), online: <www.who.int/publications/i/item/
WHO-IER-CSDH-08.1> [perma.cc/MR2X-5QXF].
24. See e.g. Guido Schmidt-Traub & Jeffrey Sachs, “Financing Sustainable Development:
Implementing the SDGs through Effective Investment Strategies and Partnerships” (2015) SDSN
Working Paper, online (pdf): <resources.unsdsn.org> [perma.cc/E3YC-UERS] at 23.
25. See Waring (1988), supra note 4.
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resources.26 The tax system should therefore assign associated profits
accordingly, with transfer pricing used as an appropriate mechanism.
3. Application of new tools to existing rules
In applying the above observations to taxation, it is necessary to establish
that existing principles allow revenue authorities to correct stated prices
even when they reflect market standards.27 To do so requires a translation
of the value associated with cost savings into transfer pricing terms. This
can be accomplished by converting cost savings to a price or premium
(discount) factor28 that can be incorporated into the tax system by means
of a transfer price adjustment under generally accepted standards, which
is to say, without inflating the overall profit of firms.29
Such cost savings may be articulated as either an itemized series of
premiums or discounts specific to particular industries or areas (itemized
cost savings method) or a single intangible asset associated with the
aggregate costs saved in a given jurisdiction (location savings method).
Adopting either approach would be expected to boost the profit assigned
to countries where cost externalization takes place relative to that currently
counted in arms-length transfer pricing terms, and the two approaches
could work in tandem not only to produce more revenue but also to provide
better information about value attribution going forward.
a. Itemized cost savings
The first approach is a series of cost savings adjustments that would
reflect the externalized costs of production using independent economic
analysis for each factor relevant to the scrutinized case. This approach
mirrors standard supply chain analysis which explains the value created

26. See e.g. Adam H Rosenzweig, “Defining a Country’s ‘Fair Share’ of Taxes” (2015) 42:2 Fla
St UL Rev 373 (proposing an allocation of cooperative surplus according to what would produce an
efficient allocation of public spending). Rosenzweig’s proposed method would also allocate more tax
base to lower-income countries but not by way of existing standards or institutions.
27. The US Altera case is the most recent demonstration of this principle. Altera Corp v Comm’r,
2018 WL 3542989 at 2 (9th Cir 2018) (holding that related parties entering into cost-sharing
arrangements must account for the value of shared stock-based compensation costs even if such costs
would not generally be shared among unrelated parties).
28. The premium or discount (depending on the direction of relevant payments) would be applied as
a percentage increase or decrease by a government as a price adjustment, even where the given price
would otherwise fall within the acceptable range of comparable prices, as described in more detail
below.
29. The exercise is thus purely distributional in nature when applied via transfer pricing or its
corollary, income associated with a permanent establishment, so long as all countries cooperate to
prevent double taxation as provided in tax treaties and domestic legislation. Lack of cooperation by
other countries would likely cause double taxation and is addressed in Part III.
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by eliminating other kinds of costs, and it tracks international standards
for allocating global profit across countries.30
Transfer pricing standards embody a process by which a multinational
firm demonstrates to each relevant tax authority that its stated income in
each jurisdiction should be respected for tax purposes.31 It should be so
respected when the inter-company transactions that produced the income
reflect what would be expected between unrelated parties acting in their
own interests in fair market conditions (in tax terms, acting at arm’s
length).32
In demonstrating this, transfer pricing standards allow firms to explain
their income calculations by reference to the price, cost, margin, or profit
associated with the underlying transactions, depending on which transfer
pricing method is applied.33 Some countries require firms to use specified
methods in a specified order of preference, or require certain methods be
used by certain firms or in certain sectors, while others simply require the
firm to choose the method that best reflects economic reality.34
In broad strokes, the relevant standards undertake a four-step
process to ensure related party prices reflect fair market value.35 First, the
taxpayer’s stated price for a given transaction must be identified.36 Second,
the stated price is compared against a range of cases in the market that
(a) are comparable and (b) involve unrelated parties.37 Third, if the stated
30. This alignment has benefits and drawbacks, which are also discussed below.
31. See e.g. U.S transfer pricing regulations. IRC §1.482-1(d) Comparability; Transfer Pricing
Guidelines, supra note 13 at para 5.27, Contemporaneous documentation (stating that each taxpayer
should determine its transfer prices “before the pricing is established” and “confirm the arm’s length
nature of its financial results at the time of filing its tax return”).
32. Transfer Pricing Guidelines, supra note 13 at para 1.8 (stating that countries have adopted the
arm’s length principle in order to create parity of tax treatment between multinational groups and
independent enterprises, as putting “associated and independent enterprises on a more equal footing
for tax purposes…avoids the creation of tax advantages or disadvantages that would otherwise distort
the relative competitive positions of either type of entity”); See also IRC §1.482-1 (a) (“The purpose
of [IRC] s 482 is to ensure that taxpayers clearly reflect income attributable to controlled transactions
and to prevent the avoidance of taxes with respect to such transactions”).
33. Transfer Pricing Guidelines, supra note 13 at paras 2.1–2.151 (laying out alternative methods);
See also IRC §1.482–1 (b)(2)(i) (same).
34. IRC §1.482–1 (c) (Best method rule); Transfer Pricing Guidelines, supra note 13 at para 2.1
(discussing approaches for the selection of the most appropriate method).
35. Solely for ease in navigating the method herein, all possible transfer pricing methods are
encompassed within the term “profit” in the discussion that follows such that the term includes, for
these purposes, “cost,” “margin,” or “profit,” as the case may be, in relation to the relevant rule in the
U.S. regulations and the Transfer Pricing Guidelines.
36. IRC §1.482–1 (b)(1) (Beginning the analysis with the concept of a “controlled transaction”
which is defined as a transaction undertaken between commonly controlled taxpayers); Transfer
Pricing Guidelines, supra note 13 at para 3.4 (providing a “typical process” that can be used to identify
controlled transactions and choose tested parties).
37. ICR §1.482–1 (d) (laying out the parameters for comparability); Transfer Pricing Guidelines,
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price falls outside the range of the comparable prices, the taxpayer may
make appropriate allowances for factors that affect either the stated price
or one or more of the comparable prices.38 Finally, if the stated price is still
outside the given range of prices, tax authorities are authorized to adjust
the stated price to reflect the price that would be between unrelated parties
in fair market conditions.39
The cost savings analysis I propose would begin at the second step
of this analysis, namely, in the search for “comparable” prices involving
unrelated parties. The challenge at this stage is that all relevant prices are
distorted by the same economic condition, namely, lack of development
and all of its manifestations in the form of inadequate protections of labour,
environment, and society, none of which are measured in conventional
GDP terms, and none of which are currently accounted for by firms in their
dealings with each other, whether they are related parties or not.40
In a conventional search for comparable prices, certain marketwide distortions are allowed to stand without notice or challenge. This
perpetuates the conditions that produce the distortion: since comparable
A is wrong, a similarly priced B will necessarily be wrong as well, and
therefore so would be prices C through Z, whether they are the taxpayer’s
stated price or a comparable. A different kind of adjustment is necessary
to properly evaluate both stated prices and comparable prices. Using
available relevant economic data, all comparable prices would need to be
adjusted to reflect what would be expected if the market was not distorted
by conditions related to chronic lack of development. As a starting point
two possible tools to demonstrate the necessary correction are examined,
namely living wage analysis and life cycle assessment.41
b. Living wage analysis
The first analysis focuses on labour, which has traditionally been attributed
a major role in multinational location decisions. The premise is that where
workers are systematically paid wages lower than that demonstrably
required to sustain life, stated prices cannot reflect fair market value
since in a fair market, unexploited workers would clearly not accept such
supra note 13 at paras 3.1–3.83 (same).
38. For example, adjustments may be made to account for different levels and forms of risk and
economic conditions that differently affects controlled versus uncontrolled taxpayers. ICR §1.482–1
(d); Transfer Pricing Guidelines, supra note 13 at paras 1.33–1.40.
39. ICR §1.482–1 (a)(2) (outlining the tax administration’s authority to make allocations); Transfer
Pricing Guidelines, supra note 13 at para 4.4 (same).
40. See Waring (1988), supra note 4.
41. In addition to the two sources described herein, costs savings could be associated with a number
of other Sustainable Development Goal targets.
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conditions.42 Since wages distorted by systemic lack of development
translate into prices that do not reflect fair market value, profit allocation
for tax purposes is accordingly distorted. Instead of properly allocating
profit to the cost saved by underpaying workers, firms will attribute their
increased profit to other sources of value in their value chains, especially
intangibles whose value is in the eye of the beholder.43
To correct this error, existing economic models would be drawn upon
to provide a more accurate allocation. The Anker Living Wage and the Asia
Floor Wage provide two independent analytical tools that are both regionand sector-specific, thus capable of providing a granular assessment of
the costs saved.44 For example, as shown in prior work, Asia Floor Wage
analysis provides sufficient information to demonstrate that an immediate
price adjustment is necessary to reflect the systemic underpayment of
workers in the garment sector in Vietnam.45 Using Unilever as a case
in point, this research demonstrated that the Asia Floor Wage could be
used to demonstrate a clear gap between actual wages paid and a minimal
amount that would be paid if workers were working in fair market value
conditions.46 This gap provides the taxing authority with evidence of the
necessary counterfactual to stated prices.
The gap thus revealed can be characterized for tax purposes
as an uncompensated portion of labour. As a negative externality,
undercompensating labour constitutes an uncounted cost saving that can
be attributed in globally accepted source terms to the jurisdiction where
the work took place. When saved costs are understood as a source of
42. See Christians & van Apeldoorn, supra note 5.
43. See Yariv Brauner, “Value in the Eye of the Beholder: The Valuation of Intangibles for Transfer
Pricing Purposes” (2008) 28 Va Tax Rev 79 at 104.
44. Richard Anker & Martha Anker, Living Wages Around the World: Manual for Measurement
(Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2017); International Labour Office, Richard Anker,
“Estimating a Living Wage: A Methodological Review” (2011) Conditions of Work and Employment
Series No 29, online (pdf) <www.ilo.org/public/libdoc/ilo/2011/111B09_199_engl.pdf> [perma.
cc/6JU4-8SXM]; Asia Floor Wage, online: <asia.floorwage.org/> [perma.cc/X8E6-T9SK] (describing
itself as “an international campaign and alliance for collective industrial bargaining in the global
garment industry”).
45. See Christians & van Apeldoorn, supra note 5 at 33-34.
46. Unilever was shown to provide an appropriate case study because it has committed to sustainable
growth, including “respecting and promoting human rights and good labour practices,” as part of
its Code of Business Principles. “Advancing Human Rights in our Own Operations,” Unilever
online:
<www.unilever.com/sustainable-living/enhancing-livelihoods/fairness-in-the-workplace/
advancing-human-rights-in-our-own-operations/ (last visited Oct. 7, 2018); Unilever’s Human Rights
Policy Statement>. See also, “Unilever’s Human Rights Policy Statement,” Unilever, online: <www.
unilever.com.co.za> [perma.cc/8D36-HKMW]. The study examined Unilever’s payment of workers
in the Vietnamese garment industry and showed a gap of between 8 and 42 cents per hour between
actual wages and those that would be required to sustain life under the circumstances. Christians &
van Apeldoorn, supra note 5.
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value, an adjustment for tax purposes to the price of goods transferred
among related parties is warranted. This adjustment does not change the
wages paid to labour or create phantom profit to the firm.47 Instead, its
sole purpose is to more accurately allocate the firm’s global profit to its
corresponding elements of the supply chain instead of allocating the profits
derived from such uncounted costs to other intangibles such as design,
branding, goodwill, and the like.
c. Life cycle assessment
In the same manner as under-compensating workers, causing or
benefiting from environmental and social destruction in a geographic
location reduces costs. These savings are currently not considered in the
profit allocation analysis, but they should be to the extent they can be
quantified. In particular, externalized environmental costs are well known
to produce price distortions in addition to incentivizing irresponsible
behaviour, the long term effects of which are demonstrably catastrophic.48
Other externalized costs may be less well documented or understood as
environmental costs, but not less impactful.49
Some of these costs are becoming increasingly quantifiable through
emerging “life cycle assessments,” which seek to measure the full cost
of production including disposal.50 Most life cycle assessment to date
has focused on ecological impacts but more recent studies expand the
analysis to social and economic impacts as well. 51 Many recent life cycle
47. That said, the articulation of the gap and its consequences may prompt future regulation. There
is the risk that some governments will choose not to regulate to better the situation of their people
and environment but will continue to claim the tax associated with the cost saved. This raises difficult
political and normative questions regarding which government should “benefit” in tax revenue
terms from ongoing exploitation—the capital exporter or the capital importer. In order to focus the
discussion on the feasibility of the proposed reallocation on the tax side, it must be assumed that the
countries that have agreed to focus resources on the Sustainable Development Goals are also occupied
with questions of accountability on the regulatory side (including where the revenue should be spent).
48. See United Nations, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Sixth Assessment Report,
online: <www.ipcc.ch/report/sixth-assessment-report-working-group-ii/> [perma.cc/RH5S-P6RQ].
49. See e.g. James Fava et al, eds, SETAC Workshop Report, A Conceptual Framework for Life
Cycle Impact Assessment (1993).
50. Recently published life cycle assessments include studies of, for example, sugarcane, sugar and
ethanol production in Thailand; electric vehicles in Brazil; and oilseed crop rotation in the Pacific
Northwest. See Wanchat Sawaengsak et al, “Development of a Social Impact Assessment Method
and Application to a Case Study of Sugarcane, Sugar, and Ethanol in Thailand” (2019) 24:10 Intl J
Life Cycle Assessment 2054, DOI: 10.1007/s11367-019-01624-8; Jorge Enrique Velandia Vargas et
al, “Life Cycle Assessment of Electric Vehicles and Buses in Brazil: Effects of Local Manufacturing,
Mass Reduction, and Energy Consumption Evolution” (2019) 24:4 Intl J Life Cycle Assessment 627,
DOI: 10.1007/s1167-018-1488-y; Sharath Kumar Ankathi et al, “Life Cycle Assessment of Oilseed
Crops Produced in Rotation with Dryland Cereals in the Inland Pacific Northwest” (2019) 24 Int’l J
Life Cycle Assessment 4, at 627-641.
51. See ISO 14040 (1997) (“LCA studies the environmental aspects and potential impacts
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assessments focused on ecological impact are quantitative in nature,
thus potentially providing the tax authority with a resource for pricing
the difference between a production line that internalizes versus one that
externalizes such costs.52
Further research is required to locate publicly available quantitative
life cycle assessments and apply them to specific industries or jurisdictions
for tax purposes.53 The goal would be to provide tax authorities with
independent economic studies demonstrating applicable price differentials,
similar to those demonstrated by the living wage assessments discussed
above. The transfer price adjustment would accordingly adjust the stated
price by the difference between stated production costs and costs actually
incurred pursuant to the life cycle assessment.
This is a resource-intensive task since life cycle assessments are timeconsuming and complex exercises, often made by specific firms as to
their unique supply chains and processes, and often not easily scaled to
industries or nations.54 In addition, many life cycle assessments are semiquantitative in nature, using a scoring system to rate a product cycle on the
basis of various indicators.55 This type of assessment may be informative
throughout a product’s life (i.e. cradle-to-grave) from raw material acquisition through production, use
and disposal [including] resource use, human health, and ecological consequences”); Walter Klöpffer
& Birgit Grahl, Life Cycle Assessment (LCA): A Guide to Best Practice (2014) at 1-2 citing the ISO
14040 and other standards and explaining that standard life cycle assessment focuses on ecological
impacts and not economic or social impacts; Subramanian Senthilkannan Muthu, Social Life Cycle
Assessment: An Insight (2015) (explaining that while environmental life cycle assessment is well
developed and widely used, social assessment is a complementary approach).
52. See Muthu, supra note 51 (discussing Type II assessments).
53. See e.g. PWC, Life Cycle Assessment and Forest Products: A White Paper (2010), online (pdf):
<www.pwc.com> [perma.cc/9PJ5-XCMU] (stating that “[w]herever possible LCA practitioners use
existing data contained in databases rather than create new data. There are public Life Cycle Inventory
(LCI) databases, which are typically free, and private databases that typically charge fees. The quality
of the data in the databases varies both within and between databases. The potential impact on the
results is often studied by sensitivity analyses on the key inputs and outputs.” at 11). An example
of a public life cycle inventory database is the National Renewable Energy Laboratory, U.S. Life
Cycle Inventory (LCI) Database (2012), online: <https://www.nrel.gov/lci/> perma.cc/QE6G-MF4Z],
which measures energy and material flows into and out of the environment in U.S.-based production
processes.
54. See e.g. UNEP, Guidelines for Social Life Cycle Assessment of Products (2009) at 57, online
(pdf):
<www.lifecycleinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/2009%20-%20Guidelines%20
for%20sLCA%20-%20EN.pdf> [perma.cc/2PHS-98WL] (affirming that social life cycle assessments
are very costly and time-consuming); PWC (2010), supra note 53 at 11 (“LCA is an assessment tool
that requires a large amount of data and data analysis.”).
55. These types of life cycle assessments use a “scale-based” approach to characterize various
“performance reference points.” See e.g. Andreas Ciroth & Juliane Franz, LCA of an Ecolabeled
Notebook: Consideration of Social and Environmental Impacts along the Entire Life Cycle (Berlin:
GreenDeltaTC GmbH, 2011). Federal Public Planning Service Sustainable Development, Brussels
(developing a scoring system using six performance levels: very good, good, satisfactory, inadequate,
poor, and very poor performance levels, and six impact levels: positive, lightly positive, indifferent,
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to a company assessing its own practices for internal purposes, but it does
not necessarily yield specific information about the cost firms save by
failing to change their practices accordingly.56
As such, qualitative or score-based assessments may be difficult to
translate into specific price adjustments without some additional work.
Future research could, for example, attempt to enlist the assistance of firms
that are engaged in socially responsible practices to undertake pro forma
analyses regarding what costs such firms could save by choosing to relax
their internal standards by opting for more environmentally and socially
harmful processes.57 Such assessments would potentially yield an accurate
estimate of some externalized costs, albeit requiring intense investment of
effort and involving a significant amount of complexity.
d. Aggregate location savings
The second method proposed for pricing in the cost savings attributable to
cost externalization is to take an aggregate approach. The approach might
be characterized as a form of “location savings,” sometimes referred to
as “location specific advantage,” a term of art whose familiarity to date
may be attributed mainly to China.58 In brief, as explained in the Transfer
Pricing Guidelines, location savings refers to “cost savings attributable to
operating in a particular market.”59
Location savings might possibly be calculated as a price differential
on a transactional basis (as in the itemized cost savings described above),
but it might also be imagined as a separate intangible to which profit
should be attributed, beyond any existing assets or activities. A single
location savings factor could be derived by proxy using research that
lightly negative, negative, and very negative effect.).
56. See e.g. UNEP, supra note 54 at 25.
57. Firms such as SAP, PWC and McKinsey routinely engage in such exercises and could be
instrumental to this research. See e.g. SAP, Implementation Services: Measure your supply chain
quickly and efficiently, online: <www.sap.com/canada-fr/services/implementation/supply-chainconsulting.html> [perma.cc/8C72-UFY5]; “Supply chain planning and optimization”, PWC, online:
<www.pwc.com/ca/en/services/consulting/operations/supply-chain-planning-and-optimization.html>
[perma.cc/5HXZ-6XJJ]; “Manufacturing & Supply Chain”, McKinsey, online <www.mckinsey.com/
business-functions/operations/how-we-help-clients/manufacturing-supply-chain> [perma.cc/HZ5AQPJQ]. However, some firms may be conflicted by private interests that benefit from the current lack
of publicity surrounding this kind of analysis.
58. See e.g. Jinyan Li & Stephen Ji, “Location-Specific Advantages: A Rising Disruptive Factor
in Transfer Pricing” (2017) 71:5 Bull for Intl Taxation 259; Martin Hearson & Wilson Pritchard,
“China’s challenge to international tax rules and the implications for global economic governance”
(2018) 94:6 Intl Affairs 1287.
59. Transfer Pricing Guidelines, supra note 13 at para 9.139 (adding at para 9.126 that “Location
savings can be derived by an MNE group that relocates some of its activities to a place where costs
(such as labour costs, real estate costs, etc.) are lower than in the location where the activities were
initially performed”).
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seeks to measure the cost of attaining various aspects of the sustainable
development goals, generally expressed as a percentage of national GDP.60
More analysis is necessary, but these studies provide a starting
point. If the amount of investment needed to achieve the sustainable
development goals of particular countries can be determined, a simple
calculation may be used to determine a location saving involved in
transacting in each jurisdiction, in tax terms. That is, for each country,
there is a quantifiable cost to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals
which could be used to formulate an aggregate location savings percentage
to plug into the transfer pricing formula (or, if ultimately adopted, into a
formula for allocating a unitary tax base).
The simplest approach is to apply a jurisdiction’s aggregate annual
development need to its annual GDP to produce a flat rate. Thus, for
example, if it was determined that a country with an annual GDP of $10
million needed to spend $1 million per year to achieve the sustainable
development goals, the rate would be 10%.61 This rate would be applied
as a location savings factor to all intercompany prices on a nationwide
basis unless it could be tailored to specified sectors depending on their
contribution to GDP or their contribution to specific problems (such as
environmental impact). The percentage would be applied as a premium to
payments into the jurisdiction (that is, increasing downstream payments),
and a discount on outbound payments (that is, decreasing upstream
payments) for tax purposes.
A sustainability-based location savings factor could be applied in a
variety of ways, but the Chinese method for location specific advantage
provides a point of departure. The Chinese method starts by calculating
a standard arm’s length return for a specified transaction, generally using
cost-plus as the transfer pricing method. 62 A typical markup percentage that
a firm in a developed country would impose in arm’s length inter-company
transaction is then determined by reference to relevant comparables. This
60. See e.g. Johannes Jütting & Shaida Badiee, “Financing SDG data needs: What does it cost?”
(26 September 2016), online (blog): <www.data4sdgs.org/news/financing-sdg-data-needs-what-doesit-cost> [perma.cc/B4PE-QG3C]; See also UNESCAP, “Expert Group Meeting on How Much Do
Ambitions Cost? Investment Needs for Achieving the Sustainable Development Goals in Asia and
the Pacific,” online: UNESCAP <www.unescap.org/events/expert-group-meeting-how-much-doambitions-cost-investment-needs-achieving-sustainable> [perma.cc/JY77-UMHJ]; Guido SchmidtTraub, “Investment Needs to Achieve the Sustainable Development Goals: Understanding the Billions
and Trillions” (2015) SDSN Working Paper, online (pdf): <resources.unsdsn.org> [perma.cc/F2HEXTRF]; Schmidt-Traub & Sachs, supra note 24.
61. To date, aggregate studies estimate that low-income countries will need to spend between 4 and
14% of national GDP in lower-middle and low-income countries, respectively. See Schmidt-Traub &
Sachs, supra note 24.
62. See Li & Ji, supra note 58.
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“full cost markup” percentage is applied to the difference in costs borne
to produce the specified good or service as between the comparables and
the target firm.
The Chinese location savings method suggests that the measured
difference in costs incurred to produce goods or provide services in China
versus in developed countries represents the location savings of operating
in China. To accurately represent sustainability instead would require
undertaking a separate calculation to determine the externalized cost
saving. As such, the chosen percentage (such as, in the example given,
the SDG needs of a country as a percentage of its GDP) would be applied
as the “externalized cost markup” in the same manner as China’s full cost
markup was applied, namely by multiplying it by the cost difference of
producing goods or providing services in the less developed country as
compared to developed countries.
The rationale of applying a differential rate in this manner is that the
needed development spending represents some measure of market-wide
circumstances that boost firm profits via cost savings. Overall development
spending needs are an admittedly imperfect approximation of location
savings, yet they are a reasonable proxy in the sense that countries are
entitled to tax the value created in their jurisdictions, and the fact that
significant spending is needed to achieve the Sustainable Development
Goals demonstrates a likelihood that the entire market is distorted by lack
of development, the non-amelioration of which produces private value
for firms. A tax authority would thus be justified in making a universal
price adjustment using the prescribed percentage, and would have a
reasonable expectation that other countries ought to cooperate with such
an adjustment.
e. Complementary approach
Each of the methods has its advantages and disadvantages, and each
will face variation in acceptance and objection by firms, governments,
and commentators.63 Factoring in some of the main administrative and
behavioural influences at play, a complementary approach would set
location savings as a default and allow itemized costs savings as a rebuttal,
at least until more and better measurement tools are available.
The primary advantage of using an itemized cost method is that it
most precisely tracks the transfer pricing guidelines as they are currently
63. See e.g. Robert Bird & Karie Davis-Nozemack, “Tax Avoidance as a Sustainability Problem”
(2018) 151:4 J Bus Ethics 1009 (explaining firm-level choices with respect to sustainability as social
risk factor assessments); Laszlo Goerke, “Corporate social responsibility and tax avoidance” (2019)
21:2 J Public Economic Theory 310 (citing Bird & Davis-Nozemack for the same observation).
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written. The tax authority making an adjustment following this method
should be viewed as interpreting an agreed standard, rather than
overriding or ignoring it. The cost savings adjustment is a positive claim
about an economic phenomenon just like any other claim relevant to the
transfer pricing analysis. Just as current transfer pricing analysis involves
consulting external databases to locate comparable prices and analyze
appropriate adjustments, the tools to be used in applying this method
are external datasets and formulas created by economists and other
professional analysts whose efforts are undertaken to correctly assess the
economic cost of relevant inputs. This makes the cost savings adjustment
of a piece with existing transfer pricing analysis.
The disadvantages to the cost savings method include the cost of
actually undertaking the method but also its complexity and its novelty.
The method is complex to the same degree and for the same reasons that
arm’s length pricing is complex.64 The intricacies involved in identifying
appropriate comparable prices and discarding inappropriate ones, and
in evaluating the factors that analogize or distinguish a scrutinized price
versus a compared price, are notorious. The complexity of transfer pricing
has been well documented and is a major reason for many calls for a
replacement regime.65 Because it closely aligns with the current system, a
sustainability-based price adjustment would suffer from the same systemic
issues.
Even so, a cost savings adjustment arguably adds little complexity
relative to the status quo. It is not materially more difficult to apply a
living wage analysis to a given price than it is to apply any other kind of
analysis involving underlying market conditions. Identifying, evaluating,
and distinguishing economic factors relevant to pricing is the raison
d’etre of the transfer pricing industry. This industry is fully capable of
applying any appropriate economic analysis, as the relevant rule requires.
Certainly, the clients of this industry are tolerant when the complexity of
a requisite analysis leads to reduced taxation.66 In short, complexity may
be a good reason to reject the transfer pricing regime as a whole, but it is
not a valid reason to accept the status quo while rejecting a sustainability
64. See e.g. Transfer Pricing Guidelines, supra note 13 at para 4.95 (“Applying the arm’s length
principle can be a resource-intensive process. It may impose a heavy administrative burden on
taxpayers and tax administrations that can be exacerbated by both complex rules and resulting
compliance demands.”)
65. See e.g. IMF, Fiscal Affairs Department & Legal Department Corporate Taxation in the Global
Economy, Policy Paper No 19/007 (Washington: IMF, 2019) at 60, online (pdf): [perma.cc/U2S27H39].
66. See e.g. Steven A Dean, “Attractive Complexity: Tax Deregulation, the Check-the-Box Election,
and the Future of Tax Simplification” (2005) 34:2 Hofstra L Rev 405.
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adjustment that would arguably lead to greater accuracy in the taxation of
multinationals.
Compared to the itemized cost savings method, the location savings
method is less accurate in the sense of correcting stated or market prices to
approximate their particular fair market value, but it is also less intricate
and will be easier for tax administrations to apply.67 The method faces a
risk of being characterized as a safe harbour approach, which has met with
resistance by policy makers in the past (but may be gaining acceptance).68
However, its simplicity and predictability may be seen as beneficial to
both firms and tax authorities, which could lead to future acceptance by the
international community as safe harbours of other kinds have received.69
Given that each method has its benefits and drawbacks, a complementary
approach could help identify the best outcome through experience. An
aggregate location savings method could serve as the default rule, but firms
could be permitted to provide documentation to support an itemized cost
savings method on a case-by-case basis. Firms that opted to measure their
itemized cost savings would presumably do so because it would reduce the
profit allocated to the jurisdiction in question, possibly raising distributive
concerns.70 However, the approach would still be valuable to the extent
it would provide governments and taxpayers with valuable information
about the efficacy of the itemized cost savings method.71 The next section
therefore explores the feasibility of adopting a sustainability adjustment
inclusive of the itemized, aggregate, and complementary approaches.

67. The method may be less contested by the taxpayer as well, for the reasons discussed below.
68. See Transfer Pricing Guidelines, supra note 13 at 204-205 (explaining the reasons for past
resistance and defining a safe harbour as “a provision that applies to a defined category of taxpayers
or transactions and that relieves eligible taxpayers from certain obligations otherwise imposed by a
country’s general transfer pricing rules” at para 4.102); see also Susan C Morse, “Safe Harbors, Sure
Shipwrecks” (2016) 49:4 U.C. Davis L Rev 1385.
69. This is arguably the case in respect of Brazil’s fixed margin approach. See e.g. André Gomes de
Oliveira & Francisco Lisboa Moreira, “The Brazilian Transfer Pricing Regime” (2017) 71:6 Bull for
Intl Taxation 6 (“the practicability and certainty provided by the Brazilian approach, which may be
problematic for some taxpayers, can also be described as advantageous to some investors. In the end,
it could result in a simple business decision: certainty or economics? In the time of BEPS, the search
for certainty could become a trend.”); Luis Eduardo Schoueri, “Arm’s Length: Beyond the Guidelines
of the OECD” (2015) 69:12 Bull for Intl Taxation 12, (citing Keynes that “It is better to be roughly
right than precisely wrong.”)
70. See Bird & Davis-Nozemack, supra note 63.
71. A pilot project could isolate one or more relatively easily priced components of production for
purposes of developing a comparison of the likely scale of the differential between the two methods.
For example, economic methods that price the carbon footprint of common supply chains might be
used as a preliminary evaluative step.
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III. Prospects for Implementation
Taking sustainability into account in tax would be an appropriate corrective
to an ongoing problem, but in designing any proposed tax reform, due
regard must be paid to feasibility in both practical and political terms.
This requires coming to terms with two of the core tropes of taxation,
namely, that any move to increase the taxation of capital is practically
impossible due to tax competition, and that unilateral change is politically
impossible because it will increase taxation. While each of these tropes
has great political power in pressuring countries to conform to a status quo
that is demonstrably flawed yet fixable, the framework proposed here has
the potential to overcome both.
1. Economic viability
A popular mantra of tax policy is that jurisdictions dependent on foreign
investment (which describes all jurisdictions to some extent) cannot tax
capital or business profits of multinationals because they will either fight,
by adopting increasingly aggressive tax avoidance practices, or flee, by
moving their operations to a more favourable location.72 As political rhetoric,
tax competition is an intuitively coherent refrain but as a causal claim it
has always been debatable.73 In any case, recent developments suggest that
the tolerance levels of governments to engage in tax competition may be
in a state of flux, as may be corporate responsiveness to broad stakeholder
preferences regarding their ecological and social impact.74
This is not to say that countries are becoming less competitive or
that firms are becoming advocates for more taxation; the opposite is
likely true in most cases. But the increasing public recognition that tax
and development are in a symbiotic relationship may allow governments
72. As a result, economically powerful countries constantly vie for national advantage even when
this results in policies that hurt those less economically powerful, and indeed, even when there is
evidence that the chosen policies are self-destructive races-to-the-bottom. For an argument that the
problem begins at the level of cities where capital is so powerful that it “distorts local decisionmaking,” requiring checks on local governmental power, see Richard Schragger, “Mobile Capital,
Local Economic Regulation, and the Democratic City” (2009) 123:2 Harv L Rev 482 at 487.
73. See e.g. Peter Wilson, “The role of taxes in location and sourcing decisions” in Alberto
Giovannini, Glenn Hubbard & Joel Slemrod, eds, Studies in international taxation (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1993) 195; Salvador Barrios, “International taxation and multinational
firm location decisions” (2012) 96:11-12 J Pub Econ 946; IMF/OECD report on Tax Certainty, online
(pdf): <www.imf.org/external/np/g20/pdf/2017/031817.pdf> [perma.cc/W5VH-HTMV]; IMF/OECD
update on Tax Certainty, online (pdf): <https://www.oecd.org/tax/tax-certainty-update-oecd-imfreport-g20-finance-ministers-july-2018.pdf> [perma.cc/2KCL-QRVG]. The effect of tax competition
on resource-rich countries is particularly difficult to gauge. See e.g. Mario Mansour & Artur Swistak,
“Tax Competition and Coordination in Extractive Industries” in Philip Daniel et al, eds, International
Taxation and the Extractive Industries (London: Routledge, 2019) at ch 13.
74. See Bird & Davis-Nozemack, supra note 63; See also Sandra K Miller & Karie Davis-Nozemack,
“Toward Consistent Duties for Publicly Traded Entities” (2016) 68:1 Fla L Rev 263.
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to view the proposed framework as supportive rather than destructive of
national competitiveness, and firms to view it as contributing to rather than
detracting from their profitability. This is first, because taking sustainability
into account would support those factors that most impact capital investment
decisions; second, because even when tax is the dispositive factor, taking
sustainability into account may not disrupt the status quo enough to merit
aggressive taxpayer response; and third, because investors, consumers,
and ultimately firms are increasingly sensitive to reputational scrutiny.
Accordingly, some firms are likely willing to embrace sustainable taxation
as a part of their overall business strategy, especially if the effect is to
increase their overall competitiveness vis a vis firms with less sustainable
practices.
One conclusion to be drawn from these observations is that a tax system
that is certain and stable is also competitive. To build such a tax system
requires countries to develop a virtuous cycle of tax and development, that
is, to raise enough revenues to sustain economically productive markets
but also to build up the institutions necessary to ensure that the revenues
are spent in productive ways and not diverted to waste, fraud, abuse, or
the like.75
The proposed framework is capable of contributing to this objective
not only by producing needed revenues but also in the way that it produces
such revenues. Because the proposal calls for determining the real costs
of underdevelopment, its operation would produce information about
various aspects of governance that contribute to this predicament. To the
extent these calculations will be revealed to the public, they contribute to
accountability in governance even as they produce the revenues necessary
to respond to governance failures. As such, in the long run, adoption of
significant reform has the potential to foster rather than detract from a
nation’s overall competitiveness.
The first impact of the proposed framework would be to increase
the declared profit of multinational firms within relatively less affluent
jurisdictions, that is, where labour and environmental externalities occur.
Since the framework requires assessing the difference between stated
prices and a readily available counterfactual fair market price, the possible
increase in profit declared in a particular country might be modest in
global terms even if significant to the adjusting country. For instance, in
the example given above with respect to the labour price differential, it
could be that the overall application of living wage standards to existing
prices in a particular market could increase the tax base by a fractional
75.
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amount compared to the status quo.76 The additional tax thereby generated
at source may simply be too small to warrant a reconsideration of core
business location decisions, in light of other considerations.
A related concern is that jurisdictions should not tax multinationals
more than independent firms because the former will fragment into the
latter to avoid even a risk of increased tax. However, even fragmented
supply chains may be comparably taxed to the extent that one firm may be
considered effectively managed if not legally controlled by another.77 When
such a relationship rises to the level of creating a permanent establishment
in the jurisdiction, a firm would be subject to the same general principles
underlying arms’ length-based transfer pricing,78 likely to the same modest
effect.79
Even if the framework would produce more than a modest change for
multinational firms in some jurisdictions, however, it does not necessarily
increase a given firm’s tax overall. The outcome depends on the responses
of other jurisdictions. International tax allocation could be a zero-sum
game with respect to profit in the sense that increasing the amount allocated
to one location should lead to corresponding decreases in others.80 To
the extent that the tax rates on the relevant income are the same in both
jurisdictions, corresponding adjustments elsewhere would eliminate any
tax increase and make the taxpayer indifferent to the reform.81 As above, a
76. See Unilever, supra note 46.
77. For example, a local firm that supplies exclusively to one firm or on detailed specifications may
be considered a dependent agent of the foreign one, thus creating a permanent establishment.
78. See e.g. Robert Couzin, supra note 12 (stating that “when it comes to allocating taxing
jurisdiction over the profits of multinational enterprises (MNEs), the dominant methodology is the
one used in transfer pricing” at 402). Where a treaty is applicable, this characterization will depend
on treaty definitions of permanent establishments involving dependent agents and may ultimately
depend on cooperation among relevant competent authorities. Where there is no treaty, domestic law
establishing residence through a permanent establishment or other criteria will apply, with attendant
interpretational implications.
79. See e.g. Susann van der Ham & Robert Halat, Transfer Pricing Perspectives: Implications of
the new permanent establishment definition on retail and consumer multinationals (undated PWC
report), online (pdf): <www.pwc.com/gx/en/tax/publications/transfer-pricing/perspectives/assets/
tp-16-implications.pdf> [perma.cc/rP42-8NPE] at 37. (“The existence of a permanent establishment
does not automatically mean a material increase in tax exposure (although it is likely to trigger
additional compliance costs and administrative burden for businesses), especially where the local
place of business already receives arm’s length remuneration. In most cases, remuneration based on
costs incurred by the PE should be appropriate, though there may be situations in which remuneration
based on commission would be more suitable.”).
80. See IRC §1.482-1(g) (describing events triggering correlative adjustments and procedures for
achieving them); Transfer Pricing Guidelines, supra note 13 at paras 4.29-4.67 (describing secondary
adjustments in general and treaty-based adjustments supported by the mutual agreement procedure
administered by competent authority). If there is no treaty, a corresponding adjustment may be
available under domestic law, but even if not, double tax may be relieved by foreign tax credit.
81. See e.g. James Hines, International Taxation and Multinational Activity (Chicago: University of
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modest rate differential between countries would likely produce relatively
minimal taxpayer response.
That said, where profit that is currently allocated to a low- or niltax jurisdiction is reallocated to a higher tax jurisdiction, corresponding
adjustments elsewhere will not alleviate the increase at source to the same
degree. In this respect, the action of the OECD to allocate more multinational
profits away from low- and nil-tax jurisdictions through the BEPS initiative
potentially helps countries that wish to adopt a sustainability-based pricing
framework in the future. In allocating multinational profits away from
low-tax regimes, this initiative raised the overall expected level of tax for
multinationals relative to customarily tolerated levels. This creates more
space for countries to tax at source since once a given tax rate is expected
to be paid, firms are indifferent as to who collects it.82
2. Consumer and investor demand for sustainability
The rising demand of some consumers, investors, and firms for an end to
unsustainable practices provides a complementary reason to be optimistic
about the viability of the proposed sustainability-based pricing adjustment.
These preferences may especially help stem capital flight and tax avoidance
where the global value chain is generally built upon developing country
resources.83
Taxation is undoubtedly an increasingly important element of
corporate social responsibility and sustainable investment measures, and
payment of a “fair share” may even form part of a firm’s social license to
operate.84 For example, in 2013, Starbucks declared its intention to make
voluntary tax payments to the UK going forward, after public protest
against it arose following media reports that it had paid no tax over the

Chicago Press, 2009) (given a specified tax rate, firms are indifferent as to whom the tax is paid).
82. OECD countries should view the sustainability adjustment as a complement to their work on
base erosion and profit shifting and in particular their work on tax issues arising from the digitalization
of the economy, but to the extent that this work was primarily about reallocating profits to OECD
member states, there might be resistance to “sharing” the base with non-member states. For discussion
see Allison Christians & Tarcisio Magalhaes, “A New Global Tax Deal for the Digital Age” (2019)
67:4 Can Tax J 1.
83. See e.g. World Bank, supra note 22 at 19 (noting that “John Connors, Group Tax Director,
Vodafone, observed that in the long run, business interests align with those of global policy-makers
and tax authorities because sustainable tax environments are good for business investment”).
84. For an explanation, See e.g. Allison Christians, “How Starbucks Lost its Social License—And
Paid £20 Million to Get it Back” (2013) 71:7 Tax Notes Intl 637 (explaining that activists descended
on 40 of Starbucks’ retail locations throughout the U.K., setting up crèches and women’s refuges to
represent the social services lost to multinational tax avoidance); Steven A Dean & Dana Brakman
Reiser, “SE(c)(3): A Tax Regime to Catalyze Social Enterprise Crowdfunding” (2015) 90:3 Ind LJ
1091; Steven A Dean & Dana Brakman Reiser, Social Enterprise and the Law: Trust, Public Benefit
and Capital Markets (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017).
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entirety of its operations there.85 Similarly, NGOs in low income countries
are now constantly bringing taxation to the headlines, potentially making
firms more reluctant to express their tax aversion in ways that may become
public. The possibility that failing to cooperate with the efforts of a state
to impose a tax may accordingly have a social cost, even if unpredictable
and inconsistent across firms and countries.86 Firms might thus be willing
to pay a modestly higher amount of tax if it provides some insurance to
protect their reputations against public outcry.
From a more pro-active position, some companies might embrace
the proposed pricing adjustments as a way to document the real costs
of certain externalities that their key stakeholders (be they founders,
managers, employees, or customers) would like to address as a matter of
preference.87 Accounting for these costs for tax purposes is one way to
ensure that these firms remain competitive with those that do not express the
same preferences.88 For example, it is conventional wisdom that garment
manufacturers cannot produce garments sustainably, in terms of paying
labourers a fair wage and curbing their environmental impact, because
these externalized costs are so high that no company can compete without
engaging in the same practices. Pricing in some of the externalities would
raise the standard, potentially making eco-conscious garment companies
more competitive.89
To be sure, green washing is a constant possibility in any public
communication regarding compliance with industry standards, especially
in connection with highly visible retail businesses. In providing incentives
to demonstrate the real costs of various social, environmental, and
economic factors at play, the complementary approach described above
potentially addresses this problem by making information and analysis a
85. The activists targeted Starbucks after a parliamentary investigative committee demanded an
accounting from it and other multinational companies that had been called out in a Reuters news story
for having paid little or no taxes to the U.K. despite consistently delivering annual financial statements
showing growing sales in the country.
86. There is an innate inconsistency in this approach because some firms are highly visible public
actors while others are completely obscure. Some firms are therefore expected to respond to public
pressure surrounding the payment of tax, while others may be less inclined to cooperate. However, this
is a general condition of public attention.
87. For example, in the case of socially responsible investment funds. See e.g. Unilever statement
on corporate mission; Patrick Jahnke, “Holders of Last Resort: The Role of Index Funds and Index
Provides in Divestment and Climate Change” (2019) University of Edinburgh Working Paper, DOI:
<10.2139/sssrn.3314906> (stating that capital markets “have a significant role to play in facilitating
a transition to a more sustainable economy” and detailing the ways in which investors express their
preferences for more sustainable companies).
88. Ibid.
89. See e.g. Megan Cerullo, “Patagonia will no longer sell vests with finance firm logos on them,”
CBS News (3 April 2019), online: <www.cbsnews.com> [perma.cc/JW7R-8868].
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cost-effective tax planning choice for some firms. The proposed pricing
adjustments thus potentially enhance accountability where firms see value
in assuring founders, investors, consumers, or the broader public that their
products are demonstrably sustainable.
3. Political viability
Finally, the need for cooperation among jurisdictions calls for caution in
adopting unilateral international tax reform.90 The concern is that absent ex
ante multinational cooperation, virtually any change to the status quo will
cause unrelieved double taxation, with capital flight and tax avoidance
the likely responses.91 However, the coherence of the proposed pricing
adjustments with status quo rules makes its unilateral adoption logistically
feasible, fitting in with established rules as well as dispute resolution
processes.
As described above, an expected policy objection to the adoption
of the proposal is that firms are likely to resist, with recourse to internal
appeals as well as, where applicable, treaty-based dispute resolution.92
The possibility of objection raises concerns that other governments will
not cooperate because they will adhere to status quo interpretations of
the transfer pricing rules to resist any sustainability-based adjustment.
This taps into the enduring trope of international taxation that all change
requires ex ante consensus, lest unrelieved double taxation arise to the
detriment of global trade and investment.
The reality is that all the elements necessary to prevent double
taxation already exist in tax treaties, in many domestic legal systems, or
both. Accordingly, ex-post harmonization is possible precisely because tax
treaties include wide latitude for jurisdictions to resolve disputes amongst
themselves. So long as the proposed sustainability-based adjustment is
consistent with the core elements of international taxation, the necessary
cooperative mechanisms also exist within the current paradigm.

90. See e.g. Business at OECD, Statement to OECD Ministerial Council Meeting May 2019, (May
2019), online (pdf): <biac.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Final-Business-at-OECD-MCM-2019statement1.pdf> [perma.cc/XX5Z-3QZB].
91. The consensus problem, expressed in broad international relations terms, is that every possible
international tax system design will produce winners and losers and there is no mutually advantageous
equilibrium to be had, so the best strategy will always be to reduce taxation. Policy change is further
encumbered by the need for consensus across differently situated countries, the excessive influence
of business lobbies, and the massive resources involved in effecting change versus adapting the status
quo.
92. See e.g. OECD, Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital: Condensed Version, arts 9,
25; see also Christians, supra note 13 (detailing the procedures by which taxpayers may appeal tax
assessments under domestic law and tax treaties).
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The proposed adjustment is consistent with the core elements of
international taxation because it introduces a method to clearly reflect
fair market value, which is the means by which transfer pricing achieves
its overall goal to distribute multinational income across countries in a
reasonable and equitable manner.93 In this sense, the proposal outlined
herein is not radical or revolutionary at all, but merely a reflection of our
improved ability to measure relevant economic factors relative to the past.
For example, transfer pricing rules clearly require taxpayers to set prices
among controlled affiliates in a way that reflects fair market value and the
authority of tax authorities to adjust prices is generally broadly permitted
to more clearly reflect fair market value.94 A sustainability-based pricing
adjustment in line with the foregoing analysis is therefore consistent with
the need to correct for distortions to fair market value in light of overall
economic conditions.95
This language, to the extent it reflects or constitutes local transfer
pricing regulations, explicitly provides the tax authority with the requisite
legal authority to adjust prices in the manner proposed herein.96 Adjusting
the cost of goods or services transferred from a controlled subsidiary to its
parent is therefore a matter of the tax authority’s application of the relevant
93. Transfer Pricing Guidelines, supra note 13 at para 5. (“OECD member countries have chosen this
separate entity approach as the most reasonable means for achieving equitable results and minimising
the risk of unrelieved double taxation.”)
94. See e.g. IRC §482.
95. Transfer Pricing Guidelines, supra note 13 at 45 (stating that prices are to be adjusted to reflect
the “economic circumstances of the parties and the market in which they operate”). The Guidelines
do not provide additional details regarding the kinds of circumstances or the modes for adjustment
they necessitate but they clearly acknowledge that “comparability issues can arise in connection
with …local market advantages or disadvantages.” Paragraph 1.144 in particular acknowledges that
“[f]eatures of the local market…may affect the arm’s length price,” and in particular notes that “the
relative availability of local country infrastructure, the relative availability of a pool of trained or
educated workers, proximity to profitable markets, and similar features…create market advantages
or disadvantages that should be taken into account. Appropriate comparability adjustments should be
made to account for such factors where reliable adjustments that will improve comparability can be
identified.” The principle is reflected in national laws, such as in the United States where regulations
provide explicitly that every transfer pricing method requires analysis of all relevant factors affecting
comparability, including overall economic conditions. See e.g. IRC §1.482–1(d)(3)(iv) (stating that
the “comparability of transactions and circumstances must be evaluated considering all factors that
could affect prices or profits in arm’s length dealings (comparability factors)…each method requires
analysis of all of the factors that affect comparability under that method, [including]… Economic
conditions”).
96. See e.g. IRC § 482 (“In any case of two or more organizations, trades, or businesses (whether or
not incorporated, whether or not organized in the United States, and whether or not affiliated) owned
or controlled directly or indirectly by the same interests, the Secretary may distribute, apportion,
or allocate gross income, deductions, credits, or allowances between or among such organizations,
trades, or businesses, if he determines that such distribution, apportionment, or allocation is necessary
in order to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the income of any of such organizations, trades,
or businesses.”).
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domestic rules. The taxpayer would of course be entitled to object to the
adjustment and engage in internal appeals as well as, where applicable,
instigate a mutual agreement procedure under an applicable tax treaty.
As an interpretation of the paradigmatic rule set, the proposed pricing
adjustment might appear unconventional, but it is within the bounds of
conventional legal interpretive approaches. Further, invoking treaty
processes opens up opportunities for governments to expressly insist that
tax outcomes align with, rather than impede, governments’ commitments
to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals. This challenge to the
political tax conventional wisdom is also relatively straightforward in
concept but raises some difficult policy issues because there is more than
one approach to achieving the underlying goals and governments must be
convinced to cooperate.97
Because sustainable growth requires sustainable tax systems, OECD
countries should view the proposal set forth herein as a complement to
BEPS. If they do so, they will use tax treaty dispute resolution processes to
work cooperatively to ensure that profits are attributed to the jurisdictions
in which demonstrable determinants of firm profitability arise.
Finally, related to the observation that much of international tax is
worked out in treaty-based dispute resolution is the observation that a
unilateral disruption to the status quo is a common method to generate
multilateral cooperation on tax.98 This may be because disruption is
necessary to demonstrate the viability of a new approach, which emboldens
others to act.99
97. The OECD proclaims that its mission is to contribute to the expansion of world trade to achieve
“the highest sustainable economic growth” in member countries. Transfer Pricing Guidelines at para 7.
Because tax treaty disputes are bilateral and because low-tax jurisdictions may not readily cooperate with
countries invoking a sustainability-based adjustment to allocate profits elsewhere, it may be necessary
for successive correlative adjustments. For example, a firm might choose to dispute a sustainabilitybased adjustment by enlisting the assistance of a competent authority in a low-tax jurisdiction against
the adjusting jurisdiction. If the adjusting jurisdiction cannot overcome the combined economic forces
of the firm and the low-tax jurisdiction, it might look to the competent authorities of jurisdictions
with other entities in the multinational structure to make their own adjustments in respect of profits
allocated to the low-tax jurisdiction. Working cooperatively potentially helps both richer and poorer
countries to prevent each other from returning to the pre-BEPS status quo, whereby most profit will be
allocated to low tax jurisdictions.
98. See e.g. Arthur Cockfield, “Shaping International Tax Law and Policy in Challenging Times”
(2018) 54:2 Stan J Intl L 223; Leopoldo Parada, Double Non-Taxation and the Use of Hybrid Entities:
An Alternative Approach in the New Era of BEPS (Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International,
2018); Leopoldo Parada, “Hybrid Entities and Conflicts of Allocation of Income within Tax Treaties:
Is New Article 1(2) of the OECD Model (article 3(1) of the MLI) the Best Solution Available?” (2018)
3 Brit Tax Rev.
99. A unilateral approach could be expanded through cooperation from other jurisdictions in
a particular region or sharing similar economic conditions, on the same principle as cross border
collective organization of nongovernmental associations, such as labour and industry groups.
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Recent examples of this pattern of disruption generating cooperation
can be seen in the tax justice movement prompting the UK to initiate an
investigation into tax avoidance at the level of the G20, which led the
OECD to begin the BEPS initiative;100 the US adoption of comprehensive
information gathering processes which led to global adoption of standards
on gathering and sharing tax information among nations;101 the US
adoption of a global minimum tax on certain kinds of income;102 and the
adoption by the UK and Australia of diverted profits taxes and similar
responses to digital economy issues which are currently prompting the
OECD to construct a consensus position.103 These examples demonstrate
that a combination of public pressure and political commitment can
produce unilateral reforms that may well be imperfect, but lead to better
cooperation and consensus going forward.
Conclusion
There is a political paralysis in addressing climate change that is indelibly
intertwined with the economic reality that we have built a world in which
climate inaction is financially subsidized and legal reform appears to be
overwhelmingly costly in political and economic terms. Reversing course
involves altering economic incentives, some of which have been hidden
in complex regulatory regimes due in part to our inability to count the
true costs of human activity. Yet recent developments in the measurement
of labour and environmental externalities present an as-yet untapped
opportunity to alter the status quo without creating undue political or
economic risk.
Connecting these developments to trends in consumer and investor
demands for more sustainability provides a means to make relatively
modest adjustments that would reduce one particularly pernicious form of
embedded impetus for human, social, and ecological destruction. The key
to the approach is that as conventionally applied and interpreted, standard
economic measurement tools too often undercount or ignore some
significant sources of value and in so doing, attribute their contributions
100. Christians & Shay, supra note 9.
101. See OECD, Standard for Automatic Exchange of Financial Account Information in Tax Matters
(OECD Publishing, 2017), online: <https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/taxation/standard-for-automaticexchange-of-financial-account-information-for-tax-matters_9789264216525-en#page3>.
102. See Stephen E Shay, J Clifton Fleming Jr, & Robert J Peroni, “Designing a 21st Century
Corporate Tax—An Advance U.S. Minimum Tax on Foreign Income and Other Measures to Protect
the Base” (2015) 17:9 Fla Tax Rev 669; Clifton Fleming Jr, Robert J Peroni & Stephen E Shay,
“Formulary Apportionment in the U.S. International Income Tax System: Putting Lipstick on a Pig?”
(2014) 36:1 Mich J Intl L 1.
103. OECD, Addressing the Tax Challenges of the Digitalisation of the Economy, (2019), online:
DOI: <10.1787/9789264216525-en>.
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to other factors. As a result of this type of systemic measurement error,
the profit derived from unsustainable practices are instead assigned to
assets, especially intellectual property, which can be located for legal
purposes in low-tax regimes, thus compounding the economic rewards of
unsustainability instead of fostering a move to greater sustainability as the
public demands.
The proposal set forth in this article calls for using emerging tools to
identify counterfactual scenarios that account for the value created where
firms benefit from significant cost savings by externalizing social and
environmental harms to the public. Applied within existing rule sets, this
approach would assign more profit to negative externalities, aligning tax
rules with the real costs of social and environmental harm.
As with all proposed reforms of regulatory systems involving
economic and political tradeoffs, the potential success of revealing and
eliminating hidden subsidies faces the logistical problem of coordination
and the economic reality of competition as major barriers. Neither of
these barriers can be fully overcome, but by working within rather than
disrupting the existing rule sets, the proposed approach takes advantage
of existing coordination processes within treaty-based dispute resolution
mechanisms on the one hand, and domestic provisions on the other. To the
extent that coordination is possible, the risk that competition will prevent
governments from implementing needed reforms is reduced. Indeed, recent
trends in political tolerance for unintended tax subsidies have already
moved the needle, creating policy space to incorporate innovations in
scientific measurements of value. The proposed approach described here
establishes a legally and politically viable means to reveal and ultimately
eliminate hidden subsidies for human, social, and ecological destruction
in line with virtually universal demands by public, private, non-profit, and
academic stakeholders.

